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IV. Argument Exchange and Demographic Faultlines14 
Abstract 
In the previous chapter, we presented a new theory of opinion polarization. In this chapter, 
we will apply this model to the research on demographic faultlines in work teams. We will 
test if the new model also predicts the polarizing effects of demographic faultlines that we 
have identified in the negative-influence model (see Chapter II). 
We will show that the argument-exchange model supports the faultline hypothesis. 
However, the new model points out several conditions for this effect which previous 
contributions have overlooked. First, even with a very strong faultline, opinions will only 
polarize in groups where individuals tend to select similar interaction partners. Second, 
polarization is more likely the stronger opinions and demographic attributes in a team are 
correlated initially, that is, prior to interaction between the group members.  
Furthermore, our new model implies that the short term effects of demographic faultlines 
differ crucially from their long term effects. Groups where demographic attributes are not 
perfectly correlated will eventually arrive at consensus even though they might suffer from 
polarization in the short run. Counter-intuitively, the model implies that the convergence 









Demographic diversity at the workplace is a major challenge for organizations and is 
becoming an increasingly important issue as the economy globalizes (for comprehensive 
reviews about theoretical and empirical research see: Bowers, Pharmer and Salas 2000; 
Milliken and Martins 1996; Pelled 1996; Stewart 2006; van Knippenberg and Schippers 
2007; Webber and Donahue 2001; Williams and O'Reilly 1998). For work teams, 
demographic diversity can be beneficial, because it broadens the social and human capital 
                                                 
14 This chapter was written together with Andreas Flache, Károly Takács and Karen A. Jehn and is currently 
under review. The title of the original article is: “In the short term we divide, in the long term we unite. 
Crisscrossing work team members and the effects of faultlines on subgroup polarization”  
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of the team. However the benefits do not accrue automatically. Demographic dissimilarity 
between team members may, at the same time, cause conflicts and tensions and thus 
threaten performance. This lead Milliken and Martins to conclude in their review of the 
field that “diversity thus appears to be a double-edged sword”(1996: 403). 
In the search for conditions that explain why diversity sometimes increases team 
performance and reduces it at other times, Lau and Murnighan (1998; 2005) proposed that 
the effects of diversity may decisively depend on the way demographic attributes, like age 
and gender, are distributed among team members. Their main hypothesis is that diversity 
impairs team functioning when the distribution of demographic attributes generates a strong 
faultline. “Group faultlines increase in strength as more attributes are highly correlated, 
reducing the number and increasing the homogeneity of resulting subgroups. In contrast, 
faultlines are weakest when attributes are not aligned and multiple subgroups can form” 
(Lau and Murnighan 1998: 328). They argue that diversity (demographics not aligned) 
increases the potential of a team for creativity and good performance but when the 
diversity is in a group with a strong faultline (demographics aligned), this potential may not 
be realized. The team may split up into subgroups with polarized opinions that cause 
conflicts between team members (Bezrukova, Thatcher and Jehn 2007). An intriguing 
implication of this theory is that an ideal workgroup composition might exist such that 
large pools of social and human capital can be obtained, but the damaging effects of 
diversity on cohesion can be avoided. 
We contribute to the faultline research by elaborating the explanation of the faultline 
hypothesis (Lau and Murnighan 1998) and thereby revealing crucial implications of 
faultline theory that have been overlooked so far. We start by reviewing two theories that 
have been used to explain faultline effects and that are based on fundamentally different 
arguments. The first, Lau and Murnighan’s (1998) theory, highlights that the interplay of 
homophilious selection of interaction partners with social influence breeds subgroup 
polarization in work teams with strong faultlines. Subgroup polarization is our main 
dependent variable and is defined as the degree to which a work team separates into 
subgroups that hold opposing opinions on work-related issues. The second theory has 
been developed almost a century ago in the classical sociological and anthropological 
literature and focuses on the integrating function of “crisscrossing actors” (Colson 1954; 
Evans-Pritchard 1939; Flap 1988; Galtung 1966; Lijphart 1977; Nieuwbeerta and Flap 
2000; Ross 1920; Simmel 1922 (1908)). These actors share at least one demographic 
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attribute with another demographic subgroup than their own and thus, function as a bridge 
over the subgroup split that was caused by the faultline.  
Lau and Murnighan (1998) did not take into account how crisscrossing actors can 
reduce subgroup polarization when the faultline is strong. We show that while their theory 
implicitly considers this, by not examining crisscrossing actors, the authors failed to realize 
some crucial implications of their theory. Foremost, we show that their theory predicts 
subgroup polarization only in the short term. We propose that in the long run, crisscrossing 
actors help to overcome subgroup polarization and group splits even in teams with very 
strong faultlines. Moreover, we show that subgroup polarization in the short term depends 
upon two further conditions that Lau and Murnighan implicitly assumed, but which they 
did not examine theoretically. First, strong faultlines entail subgroup polarization in the 
short run only when employees exhibit sufficiently strong homophily when selecting partners 
in their communication with other team members. That is, team members have a 
sufficiently strong preference for interacting with colleagues that are similar to them on 
certain attributes (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001). Second, we propose that 
faultlines entail group splits in the short run only when there is sufficient initial congruency 
between work-related opinions and demographic attributes in a work team (Homan et al. 
2007: 82; Phillips 2003: 7; Phillips et al. 2004: 503).  
Faultline effects result from a complex interplay of the interactions between multiple 
team members. As Harrison et al. (2007) have suggested, agent-based computational 
modeling is a powerful research method that allows to cope with this theoretical 
complexity and to reveal counter-intuitive implications of a theory. Frank and Fahrbach 
(1999) developed an agent-based model of complex and interrelated network and opinion 
dynamics in organizations, based on mechanisms that are very similar to those we assume. 
We follow their lead and use a formal modeling approach to show how Lau and 
Murnighan’s reasoning, on the one hand, and the theory of crisscrossing actors, on the 
other hand, can be reconciled. We present and analyze a computational model that is based 
on Lau and Murnighan’s assumptions and test if our new propositions do consistently 
follow from their theory. Our results support the proposition that faultline effects occur 
only in the short run and that strong homophily and initial congruency are crucial 
conditions for the effect of faultlines on group polarization. Finally, our formal analyses 
reveal a counter-intuitive effect of faultline strength. It turned out that the same 
communication structures that trigger short-term subgroup polarization in teams with 
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strong faultlines accelerate the process of consensus formation in the long run. Teams with 
strong faultlines might arrive at a consensus faster than teams with weak faultlines. 
IV.2. Two Explanations of faultline effects 
IV.2.1. Lau and Murnighan’s explanation of faultline effects 
Lau and Murnighan argued that all newly formed teams go through a "sensemaking process 
of understanding each other and their task" (1998: 332) to coordinate similar opinions 
about what their task is, how to fulfill it, and how to devise work. In this process, the 
interplay of two core mechanisms can cause problems in teams with a strong faultline. 
First, Lau and Murnighan assume homophilious selection of interaction partners. Team members 
tend to associate with colleagues who share relevant demographic attributes. This 
assumption is prominently supported by a large body of sociological research on 
homophily (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954) or the tendency of “birds of a feather flock 
together” that has consistently been identified as a strong force in social interactions 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001). Studies in both educational (e.g. Kandel 1978; 
Moody 2001) and organizational settings (e.g. Bacharach, Bamberger and Vashdi 2005; 
Ibarra 1992; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; Ruef, Aldrich and Carter 2003) have 
provided empirical confirmation of the homophily concept. 
Homophilious selection of interaction partners implies that the communication 
structures in a team crucially depend on faultline strength. To show this, we constructed 6 
hypothetical teams of 20 individuals (see Figure IV.1). This size is not too big to be 
unrealistic for a work team, but also large enough to allow for a sufficiently fine-grained 
variation in the strength of demographic faultlines. Each team member is described by 
three dichotomous demographic attributes (symbolized as black vs. white; A vs. B and 
rectangle vs. circle). Diversity in all teams and on all demographic dimensions is kept at its 
maximum. That is, all three dichotomous variables have a distribution in which both values 
of the attribute are equally frequent (50:50). Teams differ, however, in the strength of the 
demographic faultline. Faultline strength is denoted by the symbol f and is measured here 
by the pairwise Pearson-correlation between all pairs of demographic attributes. Applying a 
method proposed by Flache and Mäs (2008a; 2008b) we varied faultline strength between 
maximal (all pairwise Pearson correlations are 1) and minimal faultline strength (all Pearson 
correlations are 0). 
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Figure IV.1: 6 hypothetical teams with different faultline strength   
























































































































The network pictures shown in Figure IV.1 depict how faultline strength and the 
homophily mechanism shape the communication structure in the 6 work teams. Team 
members are represented by nodes. A pair of nodes is connected with a line if they have at 
least one demographic attribute in common. To depict the effects of homophilious 
selection of interaction partners, nodes have been arranged such that two individuals are 
nearer to each other the more attributes they share (Kamada and Kawai 1989; McFarland 
and Bender-deMoll 2007). The dashed circles identify the biggest subgroups of maximally 
similar individuals. In the team with the strongest faultline (team 1) the three demographic 
attributes correlate perfectly. Each pair of actors is either maximally similar or maximally 
dissimilar and therefore either interacts frequently or never. On the team level, Figure IV.1 
depicts two perfectly homogeneous but unconnected subgroups for team 1. As faultline 
strength decreases, however, this separation between subgroups becomes weaker and 
completely disappears as faultline strength is minimal (team 6). For instance, there are still 
two clearly distinct subgroups in team 3 (medium faultline strength). However, the 
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subgroups are smaller and there are also team members that can not be categorized into 
one of the subgroups. These actors share demographic attributes and therefore also 
interact with both subgroups. Note that these communication structures are a logical 
implication of faultline strength and the homophily mechanisms. 
In addition to homophily, Lau and Murnighan assume that during interaction, team 
members exert influence on each others’ opinions by exchanging persuasive arguments (Isenberg 
1986; Myers 1982; Myers and Lamm 1976; Vinokur and Burnstein 1978). “Group members 
who support similar attitudinal positions will find that, as other members support that 
position using arguments different from their own, they each have more reason to become 
even more extreme than they were before” (1998: 332). Research on “polarization” (Myers 
1982) has demonstrated how group members tend to become more extreme during group 
decision making. Faultline theory examines, however, not just polarization within one 
group, but it focuses on what we denote “subgroup polarization”, the degree to which a 
work team separates into subgroups holding opposing opinions (Lau and Murnighan 1998). 
Subgroup polarization during a team’s sense making process is problematic because it 
breeds emotional conflicts between the subgroups (Lau and Murnighan 1998) which, in 
turn, hamper good team performance (Jehn 1994). 
The interplay of homophilious selection of interaction partners and influence with 
persuasive arguments can lead to subgroup polarization in groups with strong faultlines. As 
shown in Figure IV.1, homophily creates subgroups in teams with strong faultlines. Within 
subgroups, team members frequently exchange arguments but argument exchange between 
subgroups is rare. Lau and Murnighan argue that under these conditions, small initial 
opinion differences between the subgroups might be amplified during the sense making 
process. This is because subgroup members will mostly hear and share arguments that 
support their initial opinions (Stasser 1988), causing opinions in both subgroups to shift 
towards opposing ends of the opinion scale simultaneously. In other words, subgroup 
polarization increases. By contrast, in teams with weak faultlines, group members interact 
with colleagues who hold a variety of different opinions, such that no self-reinforcing 
dynamic towards emergent subgroup polarization can develop. This mechanism implies the 
central proposition of Lau and Murnighan’s theory. 
Proposition 1: The stronger the faultline in a work team is, the stronger 
subgroup polarization will be. 
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IV.2.2. The sociological explanation of faultline effects  
Almost a century ago classical sociological and anthropological research on social order in 
stateless societies (Colson 1954; Evans-Pritchard 1939; Flap 1988; Galtung 1966; Lijphart 
1977; Ross 1920; Simmel 1922 (1908)) revealed that strong faultlines may cause a problem 
for social integration. For instance, Ross argued in 1920 in a textbook: 
“Suppose that at a given moment there is a certain strain along the line between 
Christians and Jews. If now, a strain appears along a quite different line, e.g. that between 
employers and workman, the religious opposition will become less intense. For Jewish 
bosses and Jewish workers will be estranged, likewise Christian bosses and Christian 
workman. On the other hand, Jewish and Christian capitalists will recognize that they are 
‘in the same boat’, while Jewish and Christian workers will sympathize with one another as 
fellow victims of exploitation. Take the case of a tension between blacks and whites. If the 
lines of cleavage cross, each opposition will weaken the other. But if, as sometimes 
happens, all the employers are white and all the employed are black men, then one 
antagonism reinforces the other and the rift in society is deeper then ever. So, paradoxical 
as it may sound, a society riven by a dozen oppositions along lines running in various 
directions may actually be in less danger of early break-up than one split along just one line. 
For each new cleavage narrows the cross cleft, indeed, you might say that the society is 
sewed together by its inner conflicts”(Ross 1920: 164-165) 
Although both faultline theory and the classical sociological and anthropological literature 
agree on the prediction that strong faultlines breed conflicts, they base their prediction on 
different sets of assumptions. Whereas faultline theory argues that the interplay of 
homophily and social influence may result in subgroup polarization, the sociological theory 
focuses on the integrating function of “crisscrossing” actors. Crisscrossing actors are 
individuals that share at least one demographic attribute with members of more than one 
demographic subgroup. Due to demographic similarity, they are attached to members of 
more subgroups and are thus able to conciliate in case of conflicts. Colson (1954), for 
instance, pointed to this in her studies of the African Tonga society in the 1940s. Each 
Tonga identified himself as a resident of his village and as a descendent of one of the 
Tonga-clans. However, societal rules prevented these two attributes from aligning. First, 
marriage between members of the same tribe was prohibited. Secondly, it was the man’s 
privilege to choose the village where his family lived. Third, clan membership was 
organized matrilineally. That is, individuals belonged to their mother’s descent group. 
Consequently each Tonga was attached by kinship to people living in different villages and 
at the same time by residence and his family members to descendents of different clans. 
Colson (1954) describes a conflict between the members of two clans that emerged after a 
member of one clan killed a member of the other clan. The conflict could be settled by 
persons that belonged to the victim’s clan but lived in a village together with members of 
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the murderer’s family. Because of their close relationships to both parties they could 
negotiate between the two groups and the conflict could be resolved. 
From this sociological perspective, the faultline hypothesis follows because the more 
crisscrossing actors there are in a group, the stronger are the integrating forces that prevent 
conflicts. The number of crisscrossing actors in a group is, in turn, logically related to 
faultline strength. Figure IV.1 shows that the higher the number of those team members 
that are not part of one of the subgroups (i.e. crisscrossing actors), the weaker is the 
faultline. Teams with the maximal faultline strength (Team 1) consist of only two kinds of 
actors (black, B, rectangles and white, A, circles). There are no crisscrossing actors in this team. 
The number of crisscrossing actors, however, increases as faultlines become weaker. Team 
2, for instance, still consists of two large subgroups. However, there are also three 
crisscrossing actors present. 
IV.2.3. Integrating the two theories: Why time matters 
The processes that the two explanations of the faultline hypothesis propose appear to be 
fundamentally different. On the one hand, Lau and Murnighan (1998) argue that in teams 
with strong faultlines, subgroups form that develop increasingly different opinions that tear 
the team apart. The sociological theory, on the other hand, points to those actors that 
connect the subgroups and prevent conflicts. We argue that it is of great importance for 
our understanding of faultline effects to analyze how exactly these two processes are 
related to each other. We have shown that only groups with maximally strong faultlines 
have no crisscrossing actors. If crisscrossing actors can prevent group splits, does this then 
imply that their presence might neutralize the mechanism that Lau and Murnighan have 
described? Or would homophilious selection and persuasive arguments undermine the 
integrating effects of crisscrossing actors if the faultline is sufficiently strong?  
It turns out that the same mechanisms from which Lau and Murnighan derive their 
faultline hypothesis can also be used to model the effects of crisscrossing actors. But, as we 
will show, when we explicitly integrate crisscrossing actors into Lau and Murnighan’s 
reasoning, new consequences arise for the effect of faultline strength on the dynamics of 
subgroup polarization. With our integrating model, we can identify heretofore overlooked 
conditions under which the integrating effects of crisscrossing actors can be expected to 
prevail upon the dividing effect of a strong faultline. 
Particularly, we argue that in teams with strong faultlines the processes that Lau and 
Murnighan’s describe breed polarization only in the early stage of the sensemaking process. 
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Later, however, crisscrossing actors will help overcome group splits. Homophilious 
selection implies that crisscrossing actors interact with members of both subgroups, 
because they have some demographic similarity with members of each group. Based on 
persuasive argument theory (Myers 1982), we can expect that they will get arguments from 
all sides and will also communicate them to all subgroups they interact with. In this way, 
crisscrossing actors establish indirect communication between the subgroups who fail to 
interact directly. This may result in a gradual convergence of the subgroups’ argument 
pools and also of their opinions, eventually reaching overall consensus in the work team.  
This resonates with formal theories of the dynamics of social influence (Abelson 
1964; Anderson 1991; French 1956; Harary 1959)  This literature has suggested that social 
groups inevitably tend to reach consensus on initially controversial opinions, as long as the 
group has a connected interaction network in which no member is entirely cut off from 
influence by other group members or external sources. Based on Lau and Murnighan’s 
assumption that demographic overlap implies interaction, crisscrossing actors can be seen 
as the link that integrates all group members into the network of mutual social influences. 
This suggests that, in principle, one single crisscrossing actor might suffice to create 
enough indirect communication between two subgroups to bring their opinions together. 
Thus, even in a group with a strong faultline, a small number of crisscrossing actors may 
ensure that no subgroup is entirely disconnected from outside influences. Accordingly, 
there should be no long run effect of faultline strength on subgroup polarization, except for 
the extreme case of a maximally strong faultline that divides the team into perfectly distinct 
subgroups. This absence of an effect of faultlines across almost the entire spectrum of 
possible teams is clearly contrary to what Lau and Murnighan (1998) suggest. 
We propose that time is the critical factor and that crisscrossing actors help 
overcome group splits in the long run. But we also argue that in teams with a strong 
faultline, the polarizing dynamic of emergent subgroup splits will, in the short run, be 
stronger than the integrative dynamic of indirect interaction through crisscrossing actors. 
The reason is that in a team with a strong faultline, the members of the subgroups are by 
definition exposed to more other group members who are not connected to the outgroup 
than they are exposed to influences from crisscrossing actors. Accordingly, it is likely that 
consensus within the subgroups quickly develops and – based on the persuasive argument 
mechanism – subgroups initially polarize. At the same time, every member of the subgroup 
still has a positive probability of interacting with a crisscrossing actor at least from time to 
time. Whenever this happens, there is a chance that an argument from the outgroup is 
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adopted by ingroup members. This argument can subsequently rapidly spread in the 
ingroup. Due to the homophily principle, ingroup members are highly likely to interact 
with each other because they have both a high level of consensus and they are 
demographically similar. In other words, we propose that the same mechanisms that 
according to Lau and Murnighan imply subgroup polarization in the short term, also imply 
that subgroup splits are not stable in the long run if the group comprises crisscrossing 
members. 
Proposition 2: Subgroup polarization occurs only in the short run. In the long 
run, all teams where faultlines are not maximally strong will 
develop consensus and will overcome subgroup polarization. 
IV.2.4. Conditions of the short term effects of strong faultlines 
According to propositions 1 and 2, we expect that teams with strong faultlines will polarize 
in the short term, but will overcome the split in the long run. Moreover, we propose that 
the processes, that Lau and Murnighan describe, imply short-term polarization only if two 
necessary conditions are met. Following Flache and Mäs (2008a; 2008b), we argue that 
under Lau and Murnighan’s assumptions the process of subgroup polarization crucially 
hinges on the assumption that initial congruency is sufficiently strong, meaning that 
opinions and demographic attributes in a team are already correlated initially, prior to 
interaction between the team members. If demographically similar group members do not 
share opinions more with each other than they do with demographically dissimilar others, 
then the exchange of arguments within demographic subgroups will not increase opinion 
differences between the groups because members of one subgroup do not learn more new 
arguments pro or con the original opinion than the actors in the other subgroup. As a 
consequence, subgroup polarization will not occur. Thus, an initial correlation between 
demographic attributes and opinions appears to be an essential condition for subgroup 
polarization in work teams. 
Proposition 3: Subgroup polarization increases in the beginning of the team 
dynamics only if the initial congruency is sufficiently high. Even 
teams with a strong faultline will not polarize if congruency is 
weak. 
We furthermore propose that subgroup polarization can only take place if homophily is 
sufficiently strong. We define the strength of homophily as the degree to which interaction 
between similar actors is more likely than interaction between dissimilar actors. The 
strength of homophily in teams might be determined by the institutional context of work 
teams. For instance, in teams with high task interdependence workers are forced to 
IV. Argument Exchange and Demographic Faultlines 
 
105
collaborate with both similar and dissimilar colleagues to fulfill their tasks. Thus, in these 
teams similarity will only weakly influence the choice of interaction partners. As a 
consequence, team members interact frequently with members who hold different opinions 
and will thus be influenced by them. Such a context would make it unlikely that the teams’ 
opinions polarize, even if faultlines are strong (Molleman 2005). 
Proposition 4: Subgroup polarization increases in the beginning of the team 
dynamics only if homophily is sufficiently strong. Even teams 
with a strong faultline will not polarize if homophily is 
sufficiently weak. 
IV.3. The Model 
The exact logical implications of the combination of homophilious selection, persuasive 
influence, and faultline strength result from a complex interplay of these mechanisms 
simultaneously operating in multiple actors responding to each others’ behavior. The 
method of computational agent-based modeling (Adner et al. 2009; Harrison et al. 2007; 
Macy and Willer 2002)  provides multiple examples how in such a complex multi-agent 
system simple theoretical assumptions may generate counter-intuitive implications that 
would have been overlooked without model formalization (e.g. Frank and Fahrbach 1999; 
Siggelkow and Rivkin 2006; Stasser 1988). Accordingly, we conducted a strict test of the 
logical consistency of our reasoning (Adner et al. 2009) with a formal computational model. 
In fact, we test if the four propositions really follow logically from the assumptions of Lau 
and Murnighan’s theory. Furthermore, our formal analyses revealed a new and unexpected 
effect of strong faultlines in work teams that has been overlooked in previous theorizing. 
Our formal model is based on the two mechanisms of Lau and Murnighan’s (1998) 
informal reasoning: homophilious selection of interaction partners and influence with 
persuasive arguments. In this model, each of the N team members is represented as an 
agent i characterized by D demographic attributes (ci,d) and K opinions (oi,k), where d refers to the 
d’th demographic dimension and k to the k’th opinion. The demographic attributes can 
either take the value 1 or -1 ( { }1;1−∈di,c ) and remain unchanged in the progress of 
interaction. The opinions of the actors vary between -1 and +1 ( 11 +≤≤− ki,o ) and are 
open to influence.  
Agents base their opinions on arguments ak,l. For simplicity, we represent arguments as 
being either in favor of or against holding a pro-opinion (oi,k > 0) on the corresponding 
issue ( { }1;1−∈lk,a ). For each issue k there exist P pro arguments (ak,l = 1) and C con 
IV. Argument Exchange and Demographic Faultlines 
 
106
arguments (ak,l = -1). Which arguments exist in a given work team setting is summarized in 
the arguments matrix. This matrix has K columns and P+C rows. Cells with a row number 
smaller than P+1 hold pro arguments, i.e. ak,l = +1. The remaining columns hold con 
arguments, i.e. a ak,l = -1. Matrix (a) in Figure IV.2 is an example of an argument matrix 
with one column (k=1) and 3 pro and 3 con arguments per issue (P=C=3). 


















































































































































Initial relevancy  
matrix of j* 
Updated relevancy 
 matrix of i* (example 1) 
(a) 
Updated relevancy  
matrix of i* (example 2) 
(d) (e) 
Initial relevancy  
matrix of i* 
(c) (b) 
 
To take into account the limited cognitive capacities of humans, we assume that agents 
base their opinion not on all existing arguments but on a sample of S (S ≤ P+C) arguments. 
Technically, an agent’s opinion on issue k is the average value (ak,l) of the arguments the 
agent considers as relevant (see equation 1). Thus, the more pro (con) arguments an agent’s 









1           (1) 
Furthermore, agents rank relevant arguments that address issue k according to their 
recency. As we show below, the more recent an argument is, the longer an agent will 
consider this argument for opinion formation. However, as equation (1) shows, the recency 
of an argument has no effect on the extent to which an argument shapes the current 
opinion. We denote recency (sk,l,i) for agent i of the argument l that addresses issue k with 
integer values between 0 and S { }Ss il,k, ,...0∈ . A recency value of sk,l,i = 0 indicates that the 
argument ak,l is not relevant for actor i. Values above zero indicate that this argument affects 
actor i’s opinion on issue k. The most recent argument has the recency value of sk,l,i = S, the 
second most recent argument has the value S-1, and so on. Thus, if three arguments are 
relevant (S=3), then one has a recency of 1, one has a recency of 2, and one has a recency 
of 3. See matrix b in Figure IV.2 for an agent’s relevance matrix for one issue (k=1), 6 
existing arguments per issue (P=C=3) of which only three are relevant at a time (S=3). This 
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agent considers one pro argument and two con arguments. According to equation (1) the 
agent adopts an opinion of oi,k=-1/3. 
We model the sense making process of a team as a sequence of events, each event 
corresponding to one interaction between two agents. An interaction starts with the 
partner selection phase and is continued by the social influence phase. In the partner 
selection phase, two agents are matched for interaction, based on homophilious selection. 
Subsequently, an opinion of one of the interacting agents is updated, based on the 
persuasive argument mechanism. 
IV.3.1. Homophilious selection 
We implement the partner selection phase as follows. In each event the computer program 
first randomly picks an agent i*. All agents have at all events the same probability to be 
picked. Then an interaction partner j (j ≠ i*) is selected. To incorporate homophily, the 
probability that actor j is chosen as interaction partner depends on the similarity between i* 
and j. As confirmed by empirical research we assume that both demographic similarity 
(Ibarra 1992; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001; 
Ruef, Aldrich and Carter 2003) and opinion similarity (Byrne 1971) increase the probability 
to interact. Similarity simi*,j varies between 0 and 1. A similarity of zero means that the two 
actors are maximally dissimilar whereas a value of 1 indicates that both hold the same 
opinions and the same demographic attributes. We assume that all attributes are equally 




















1     (2) 
The probability that actor j is selected as interaction partner (pj) is derived from the relative 
similarity of i* and j compared to the similarities of i* to all other actors, except i* herself. 
To vary the strength of homophily we include furthermore a parameter h into the model (h>0). 
The higher the value of h, the more the relative similarity of the focal agent i* and agent j 














p          (3) 
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Equation 3 shows that the more similar j is to i*, the higher is the probability that they will 
interact. If two actors differ maximally with regard to their opinions and their demographic 
attributes then the probability of interaction equals zero.  
IV.3.2. Persuasive Arguments 
After the interaction partners i* and j* have been selected for the respective event, agent i* 
is influenced by j*. We implement social influence through persuasive arguments in two 
steps. First, one of the arguments that j* considers as relevant is adopted by i*. For this, 
one of the K opinions is selected randomly for update (k*), with the same probability (1/K) 
for all opinions. Then one of the S arguments that are relevant for j is picked (ak*,l*) with 
equal probability (1/S) for all relevant arguments. Arguments that are not relevant for j* are 
not chosen. The chosen argument is adopted by i*. Technically, the argument ak*,l*  in i*’s 
relevance matrix adopts the value S+1 (sk*,l*,i* = S+1). 
When an agent’s relevancy matrix has been updated repeatedly, it is likely that all 
existing arguments have been adopted at least once. However, it does not seem reasonable 
that after some time agents consider all arguments as relevant. To avoid this, we 
implemented a second step of the influence process. The second step assures that the 
number of arguments that are relevant for an agent remains constant at S during the whole 
sense making process. This implies that when an agent i* has adopted an argument that has 
not been relevant before, one of the arguments that are currently relevant for i* will be 
dropped. We assume that agents drop the argument that has been adopted least recently. 
This reflects the idea that every time an agent hears an argument from an interaction 
partner, the cognitive importance of that argument is reinforced. The longer ago an 
argument has been heard from another agent for the last time, the less important the 
argument is considered to be and sooner or later it will be seen as entirely unimportant. 
Technically, we implement this in the model such that the relevance matrix of i* is updated 
by subtracting one from all non-zero recency values. The argument that was communicated 
between i* and j* in the present event adopts at the end of the iteration a recency value of 
S (sk*,l*,i* = S). All other relevant arguments decline in recency. We also have tested 
alternative dropping rules, to assure the robustness of our results. Most importantly, we 
implemented that the argument for dropping is selected at random. Computational 
experiments revealed that all qualitative results reported below are robust to this 
modification of the model. 
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To illustrate the updating phase, Figure IV.2 contains two examples. Assume that 
matrix (b) is the initial relevancy matrix of agent i*. Matrix (c) is the relevancy matrix of i*’s 
interaction partner j*. Before the update, the first argument is not relevant for i* (see the 
circle in matrix (b)), but it is relevant for j*. Hence, it is possible that i* adopts the first 
argument, resulting in the updated relevance matrix for i* shown in (d). Here the 
communicated argument is maximally recent (see the circle in matrix d). The recency of the 
remaining arguments has been reduced by 1. Note that this changed i*‘s opinion which 
shifted from -1/3 to +1/3 because i* adopted a pro and dropped a con argument. As a 
second example, assume now that not the first argument is selected for update but 
argument number 4. This argument has already been relevant for i* (see the square in 
matrix (b)). However, its recency has increased due to the interaction with j* (see the 
square in matrix (e)). Note that this has no consequence on i*’s opinion. 
Interaction events are iterated until the system reaches equilibrium (Young 2001). 
Our model has exactly two equilibria, corresponding to perfect consensus or perfect 
subgroup polarization. Perfect consensus is reached when all agents hold the same 
opinions and, base these opinions on the same arguments. Then, no further change is 
possible. If all agents hold the same opinion but base that opinion on different arguments, 
then opinions can still change in upcoming events. Perfect subgroup polarization obtains if 
there are two subgroups, the members of each subgroup agree on all opinions and 
arguments with each other and the pairwise similarity (simi,j) between agents of different 
subgroups is zero. That is, the members of the subgroups maximally differ with respect to 
all demographic attributes and all opinions. If all members of the subgroups base their 
opinions on the same arguments, then this outcome is stable. 
Obviously, the second equilibrium can only be reached in teams where faultline 
strength is maximal (f=1), because in these teams there are no crisscrossing agents. 
Crisscrossing agents share at least one demographic attribute with members of both 
demographic subgroups. Accordingly, if there is a crisscrossing agent and the two 
subgroups still disagree, a positive probability remains that arguments of the one subgroup 
are adopted by the other and the disagreement will vanish.  
Some of our propositions and experiments focus on the duration of the sense making 
process, i.e. the time that it takes before consensus or perfect polarization has been 
reached. To be sure, we refrain from formulating statements about effects of the 
independent variables in our experiments on the absolute duration (e.g. in days or seconds) 
of the sense making process. We are not aware of any empirical evidence that would allow 
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assessing meaningfully the duration of a simulated interaction event in real time. However, 
it seems reasonable to assume that the more interaction events occur before equilibrium, 
the longer such a process also would take in real time. This allows us to compare the length 
of the process in terms of number of events under different conditions. 
IV.4. Simulation Experiments  
The central outcome variable of faultline theory is the level of subgroup polarization in 
work teams. To quantify subgroup polarization we use a measure called polarization (Flache 
and Mäs 2008a). It captures the degree to which the group can be separated into a small set 
of factions who are mutually antagonistic in the opinion space and have maximal internal 
agreement. To compute polarization, we use the variance of pairwise opinion agreement 
across all pairs of agents in the population, where agreement is ranging between -1 (total 
disagreement) and +1 (full agreement), measured as one minus the average distance of 
opinions (averaged across all K subdimensions). This measure obviously adopts its lowest 
level of zero for the case of perfect opinion consensus. The maximum level of opinion 
polarization (polarization=1) is obtained when the population is equally divided between the 
opposite ends of the opinion scale at -1 and +1 and all opinion dimensions are perfectly 
correlated. 
To test whether our propositions follow consistently from the model, we conducted 
computational experiments varying three model parameters: the strength of faultlines (f), 
the initial correlation between demographic attributes and opinions (w) and the strength of 
homophily (h). For the remaining parameters we imposed values that are realistic and allow 
at the same time that the model generates sufficient variance in the outcome variables. 
Across all conditions, we assumed a team size of 20 (N=20) and used three fixed 
(demographic) attributes (D=3). Furthermore we assume that only one issue is relevant 
(K=1). Including further issues (K>1) makes it necessary to control for the correlations 
between the opinions and between each opinion and the demographic attributes. Since we 
focus here on the effects of demographic faultlines, we decided to keep the number of 
parameters varied in the experiment low and consider only one issue. Finally, we assumed 
that there exist always 10 pro (P=10) and 10 con (C=10) arguments. We assigned the value 
4 to S in all conditions meaning that the actors base their opinions on 4 arguments. 
To vary faultline strength (f) in the experiments, we used exactly the same 
distributions of demographic attributes that we used in Figure IV.1 (cf. Flache and Mäs 
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2008a; 2008b). We varied the Pearson correlation between each pair of demographic 
attributes from 0 to 1 in steps of .2. Of course, there are many alternative distributions of 
the three variables that result in the same bivariate correlations. The distributions we used, 
however, are the only ones that produce equal correlations between all pairs of 
demographic attributes and at the same time keep diversity maximal. We chose equal 
correlations to resolve a conceptual unclarity in Lau and Murnighan’s definition of faultline 
strength. Do we, for example, speak of a strong faultline if two variables x and y are 
perfectly correlated but completely unrelated to a third variable z? Or, would we regard the 
faultline as stronger or weaker if x and y are correlated only with r=.8 but the correlation 
between x and z would rise to .6? These questions do not occur if all pairs or variables are 
equally correlated. Furthermore, considering unequal correlations between the 
demographic attributes does not affect the results. Also with unequal correlations, it holds 
that the weaker the correlation between the demographic dimensions, the smaller are the 
subgroups and the more crisscrossing actors there are in a team. Furthermore, as long as 
not all pairwise correlations are maximal (f=1), crisscrossing actors must be present.    
To manipulate the level of initial congruency (w), we related the initial opinion to the 
first demographic attribute. The extent to which this affects the correlation of the opinion 
with the remaining demographic attributes depends on faultline strength (f). The stronger 
the faultline, the higher is the correlation between the first demographic attribute and the 
other demographic attributes. Accordingly, the stronger the faultline, the more similar are 
the correlations between the opinion and the first, second etc. demographic attribute. 
Technically, we assigned S arguments to each agent. For each of the S arguments, we 
assigned one of the existing pro arguments with the probability w when the agent holds the 
value 1 at the first demographic attribute and one of the con arguments otherwise. Agents 
with the value -1 at the first demographic attribute received a pro argument with 
probability 1-w. For instance, if w is 0.5, then pro and con arguments always have the same 
probability to be assigned. On average, this results in a Pearson-correlation between the 
first demographic attribute and the opinion of zero. However, as w increases, agents with 
the value 1 (-1) at the first demographic attribute more likely receive a pro (con) argument. 
This entails a higher Pearson-correlation between the first demographic attribute and the 
opinion as w increases. Under w=1, the opinion and the first demographic attribute 
perfectly align. More precisely, all agents that hold the value 1 at the first demographic 
attribute also hold opinion values of 1 and all agents who belong to the other demographic 
subgroup on the first dimension, hold opinion values of -1.  
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We varied w between .5 and 1 in steps of .1. We do not consider w-values below .5. 
Such values would lead to a negative correlation between the opinion and the demographic 
attributes. Since the actual values of the opinion and the demographic attributes have no 
substantial meaning, it makes no difference if opinions and demographic are positively or 
negatively correlated. To test the effects of the strength of homophily we manipulated the 
parameter h (see equation 3), varying it between 1 and 5 steps of 1. A value of h=1 
expresses that agents have a weak preference to interact with similar team mates. The value 
of h=5 corresponds to a very strong homophily. 
All in all we inspect 6*6*5 = 180 conditions in our computational experiments. The 5 
conditions in which faultline strength is maximal (f=1) and the initial correlation between 
opinions and demographic attributes is maximal (w=1) have been excluded because the 
similarity (simi,j) between agents is under this condition either 1 or 0. In these cases, it is 
logically impossible that members of different subgroups will interact and opinions will 
therefore not change. For reliability, we conducted 500 independent replications per 
condition. 
IV.5. Results 
We present the results in three steps. In the first step, we present two ideal-typical 
simulation runs to illustrate model dynamics. We then turn to the consistency tests of the 
four propositions. Finally, we present additional analyses that revealed an unexpected effect 
of faultline strength.  
IV.5.1. Ideal-typical simulation runs 
Figure IV.3 demonstrates an ideal-typical simulation run with maximal faultline strength 
(f=1). To trigger subgroup polarization, we imposed conditions that, according to the 
propositions, make polarization very likely. We assumed strong homophily (h=5) and 
imposed a relatively strong correlation of initial opinions with demographic attributes 
(w=.8). The latter generated for this run an initial Pearson correlation between the opinion 
and the three demographic attributes of .77. Figure IV.3 shows the development of 
polarization and the distribution of the opinion at different stages of the simulation run. The 
histograms show the respective opinion distribution. The network pictures describe the 
resulting interaction structure. In the network pictures, each agent is represented by a circle. 
The color of a circle indicates to which of the two demographic subgroups the respective 
agent belongs. Each pair of agents that has a nonzero overall similarity (simi,j) is connected 
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by a line, symbolizing that there is a nonzero probability that these two agents interact. 
Because we focus here on the development of opinions in the team, the arrangement of the 
circles is only based on opinion similarity. Thus, circles are arranged in a way such that the 
nearer agents are placed to each other, the more similar their opinions are (Kamada and 
Kawai 1989; McFarland and Bender-deMoll 2007). 
Figure IV.3: Ideal-typical run with maximal faultline strength (f=1, h=5, w=.8) 
1st event  67th event 
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Initially (1st event in Figure IV.3), the opinion was almost uniformly distributed in this 
simulation run. Nevertheless, the corresponding network picture reveals that there are 
already initially systematic opinion differences between the demographic subgroups. The 
change of the histograms of the subsequent events shows that over time opinion 
differences between the subgroups increase. Consequently, the number of lines between 
the subgroups also decreases over time. Eventually (by event 3400) the subgroups hold 
maximally opposing opinions. The exchange of arguments between subgroups stopped at 
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this point, because there is neither an overlap in demographic attributes nor in opinions 
between agents from different subgroups. Opinion changes have now become impossible 
because agents only interact with team members hold the same opinion and arguments.  
Figure IV.4: Ideal-typical run with 3 crisscrossing agents (f=.8, h=5, w=.8) 
1st event  235th event 
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Figure IV.3 depicts ideal-typical dynamics that ended in a stable group split. This shows 
that our model can generate the dynamics that Lau and Murnighan described in their 
informal reasoning if the faultline is maximally strong. Proposition 2, however, expects that 
dynamics differ crucially when crisscrossing actors are present. Figure IV.4 shows an ideal-
typical run that supports the proposition. In this run, faultlines were slightly weaker than in 
the condition of Figure IV.3. For comparison, we retain all further parameters of the first 
illustrative run with maximal faultline strength (h=5, w=0.8), but we slightly reduce the 
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strength of the faultline to f=0.8. Now, the team contains three crisscrossing agents (see the 
three squares in network pictures of Figure IV.4). Initially (see 1st event), the opinion is 
again almost uniformly distributed and the demographic subgroups already hold somewhat 
different opinions. Again, we observe increasing subgroup polarization, just as Lau and 
Murnighan proposed. After the 705th event the work teams fell apart into two opposing 
subgroups with maximally different opinions. Within the two subgroups, the agents share 
the same opinions and also quickly coordinate on a common vector of arguments. 
However, the two subgroups are not completely unconnected: due to the three 
crisscrossing actors there is still some exchange of arguments between the subgroups. The 
network picture of the 11750th event demonstrates that one of the crisscrossing actors 
adopted an argument that changed his opinion. Subsequently, this argument spreads in the 
crisscrossing actors’ subgroup and the opinion differences between the subgroups decrease 
(see event 13160). This convergence process continues until overall consensus is reached. 
IV.5.2. Consistency tests of the propositions  
Long- term effects. According to Lau and Murnighan, higher faultline strength entails 
more subgroup polarization (proposition 1). Proposition 2, however, claims that in teams 
with non-maximal faultline strength this effect can only be observed in the short term. Our 
experiments clearly confirmed proposition 2. All simulated work teams with faultline 
strength below its theoretical maximum eventually ended in overall opinion consensus. 
That is, all team members held the same opinion and based it on exactly the same 
arguments. 
In teams with maximally strong faultlines, however, we found perfect subgroup 
polarization, but not in all simulation runs. Figure IV.5 shows how the initial congruency 
(w) and the strength of homophily (h) affected the frequency of runs that ended in perfect 
subgroup polarization. More precisely, the size of the bubbles in Figure IV.5 corresponds 
to the percentage of runs under the respective condition that ended in stable group splits. 
For instance, 49.6% of 500 runs with very strong homophily (h=5) and very strong initial 
correlation between the opinion and the demographic attributes (w=.9) ended in a group 
split with two equally large subgroups and maximally opposing opinions. As suggested by 
the propositions 3 and 4, the higher the values of h and w are, the more likely subgroup 
polarization occurs. Figure IV.5 thus confirms that our implementation of Lau and 
Murnighan’s mechanisms can explain stable subgroup polarization in teams with maximally 
strong faultlines. But, even with maximal faultline strength, group splits remain unlikely if 
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homophily is weak or the opinions are not already initially strongly aligned with the 
demographic attributes. 
Figure IV.5: Percentage of runs that ended in stable splits (f=1) 
0 0 0 0 2.6
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Short-term effects. Proposition 2 predicts increasing subgroup polarization in the short 
term even though teams reach consensus in the long term. To asses the short term 
polarization in the simulated work teams we measured the maximal value of polarization that 
teams exhibited during simulation runs and compared this value to the runs’ initial value of 
polarization. The difference between these two values indicates to which degree groups 
split up in the short run independent on whether the split occurred right at the beginning 
of the run or later. To test if faultlines trigger short term polarization (proposition 2), 
Figure IV.6 shows bar graphs broken down by faultline strength (f). The gray part of each 
bar in Figure IV.6 depicts the average initial level of polarization in the teams. The black part 
of the bars shows the average increase in polarization. Both parts add up to the average of 
the maximal value of polarization. We excluded the conditions where w=1, because here 
polarization is initialized at it’s logical maximum and cannot further increase. Figure IV.6 
shows a stronger increase in the maximal value of polarization as faultlines become stronger 
(f) and thus supports proposition 2. At least in the short run, faultlines trigger subgroup 
polarization. 
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According to proposition 3, the higher the initial congruency, the stronger should be short 
term effects of strong faultlines on polarization. To test that, we display in Figure IV.7 the 
effects of congruency (w) on maximal polarization broken down by faultline strength f. The 
figure shows that the initial polarization depends on w (see the gray parts of the bars). This is 
a technical consequence of congruency that occurs because opinions align closer with the 
50:50 split on the values of +1 and -1 in the first demographic attribute, as w increases. 
There is, however, no such relationship of initial opinion polarization to faultline strength 
because the distribution of the first demographic attribute is the same for all levels of 
faultline strength. It turns out that the maximal value of polarization (see the complete bars) 
in all subgraphs increases with w. However, as the size of the black areas shows, this is 
mainly the result our manipulation of w. If faultlines are not strong (f<.8), the mean 
increase of polarization declines with the initial correlation between opinion and the first 
demographic attribute. We believe that this results from a ceiling effect. If faultlines are 
weak, then most pairs of agents have a relatively high similarity (simij) because of shared 
demographic attributes. The potential of opinion polarization in these teams is thus very 
low. If w is high, these teams start out close to their potential maximum of polarization. As a 
consequence, polarization can only rise moderately above the initial level and will decline 
soon thereafter. If faultlines are strong (f>.6), however, the model produces the effect of w 
that Proposition 3 expected. The black parts of the bars in the subgraphs for faultline 
strengths of .8 and 1 show that a higher initial correlation of opinion and first demographic 
attribute entails more opinion polarization.  
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Proposition 4 suggests that subgroup polarization should increase with stronger 
homophily. Figure IV.8 confirms that the increase in polarization (see the black parts of the 
bars) is higher for stronger homophily (h). Comparison of different faultline levels also 
reveals that the effect of homophily strength increases in the strength of faultlines (f). If 
faultlines are weak, then even a very strong preference of the agents to interact with similar 
team members will cause only little increase in polarization in the short run. If faultlines are 
stronger, then strong homophily results in a larger increase in polarization. 
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IV.5.3. Relative time until convergence  
The simulation experiments have confirmed that all teams that contain crisscrossing actors 
eventually arrived at consensus, even though many polarized in the short term. The 
analyses of the length of this convergence process, however, led to an unexpected and 
counter-intuitive result: the stronger the faultline in a team and the stronger homophily, the 
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faster the teams arrive at consensus. Figure IV.9 shows a bubble graph expressing the 
average number of events it took until the runs ended in overall consensus, broken down 
by faultline strength (f) and homophily strength (h). The graph shows that the less events 
were needed to reach consensus, the stronger the faultline was. It also shows that stronger 
homophily is associated with faster emergence of opinion consensus.  
To confirm this counter-intuitive result, we conducted simulation experiments where 
teams started with perfect polarization (w=1) and varied faultline strength. In the runs with 
weak faultlines (f=0) the teams very quickly overcame the group split but it took them very 
long to arrive at consensus. By contrast, it took the teams with a strong faultline (f=.8) 
longer to overcome the initial group split. However, once the split was overcome, the 
teams quickly found a consensus.  
Figure IV.9: Average number of events until the teams arrived at an overall consensus 
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We explain this effect as a consequence of the interaction structure in teams with strong 
faultlines. The same interaction structure that causes subgroup polarization in the short 
term accelerates the convergence process as soon as the opinion split has been overcome. 
As we have shown in Figure IV.1, teams with strong faultlines consist of subgroups. 
Frequent exchange of arguments within the subgroups makes the subgroups reach internal 
consensus quickly. When there are crisscrossing agents, however, from time to time new 
arguments enter a subgroup and lead to changing opinions and a new subgroup consensus. 
If there are only a few crisscrossing agents present (strong faultlines), this process leads to a 
gradual convergence of opinions across the subgroups. Most importantly, this accelerates 
coordination on a single vector of arguments in the whole team much faster. The reason is 
that subgroups adopt a new argument and drop one of the arguments used before. Once 
an argument is dropped by a subgroup, it will not reoccur in later interactions. With weak 
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faultlines, however, there are more crisscrossing agents and new arguments enter the 
discussion within subgroups more frequently. This can be so frequent that subgroups do 
not manage to find consensus before a new argument enters. As a consequence, the 
number of arguments and opinion diversity within each subgroup remains high and the 
gradual convergence of subgroups that we found in groups with strong faultlines does not 
develop. Furthermore, frequent argument exchange with crisscrossing actors leads to a fast 
spread of arguments across the entire team. Thus, if a subgroup collectively drops an 
argument, this argument may still be used by other team members and might re-enter the 
discussion in the subgroup over and over again. Overall, the convergence of opinions 
occurs faster in the structured interaction network of a team with a strong faultline than in 
the unstructured communication pattern in a team with a weak faultline. 
IV.6. Summary and Implications  
Lau and Murnighan (1998) argued that teams with a strong demographic faultline likely 
experience subgroup polarization. We challenged this prediction, arguing that Lau and 
Murnighan overlooked the important role of crisscrossing actors in the sense making 
process of teams. Crisscrossing actors are team members who share some demographic 
attributes with multiple subgroups and can thus function as a bridge over the faultline. We 
showed that the faultline concept implies that even teams with very strong faultlines 
comprise at least a few crisscrossing actors. Accordingly, we argued that also in teams with 
strong faultlines there are processes that could prevent subgroup polarization or, if teams 
are polarized, help to overcome group splits. This led us to propose that strong faultlines 
breed subgroup polarization only in the short run. If there are crisscrossing actors in a 
team, even teams with strong faultlines will eventually overcome polarization. Moreover, 
we propose that Lau and Murnighan’s theory implicitly factors crisscrossing effects in, 
although they did consider this explicitly. To underpin this claim, we developed a formal 
model based on the central behavioral assumptions of Lau and Murnighan’s theory. We 
conducted computational experiments to test whether our new propositions follow 
consistently from the behavioral assumptions. Our analyses clearly confirmed this. We also 
proposed that faultline effects may crucially depend on core assumptions hidden in 
previous theoretical elaborations. We found that stronger faultlines only imply opinion 
polarization if demographic attributes are strongly correlated with the opinions of team 
members even before they influence each other. Moreover, to logically derive effects of 
strong faultlines, the assumption is needed that homophilious selection plays an important 
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role in interactions within the team. Finally, contrary to intuition, our simulations revealed 
that teams with strong faultlines might be faster in arriving at an opinion consensus.  
Our analyses confirm that teams with strong faultlines experience more polarization 
than teams with weak faultlines. However, if faultlines are not maximally strong, effects of 
faultline strength occur only for the short term dynamics in a team. In the long run, group 
splits disappear sooner or later. This appears to be good news for managers. Nevertheless, 
we advise readers to interpret our results with caution. The main purpose of our analysis 
was to point to hidden implications of the mechanisms assumed by faultline theory. This 
does not preclude that other mechanisms not considered by the theory may lead to 
different consequences. Specifically, our formal model did not consider the possibility that 
social identities form around subgroups in the process of a group split. Members of the 
subgroups may then “act to legitimize the subgroups, and conflict between them may 
continue to be likely” (Lau and Murnighan 1998: 333). Strong subgroup identification may 
motivate team members to refuse communication with crisscrossing actors. Identification 
might also promote the development of stereotypes about the demographic subgroups. 
Since crisscrossing actors fit into none of the stereotypes, they may be rejected by members 
of both demographic subgroups. If such negativity arises then crisscrossing actors will not 
be able to conciliate.  
Despite the possibility that identity formation may reduce the influence of 
crisscrossing actors, our results should also not be discarded too readily. We have shown 
that integrating effects of crisscrossing actors can in the long run only be precluded if these 
actors are perfectly excluded from the interaction networks within the subgroups. Even if 
subgroup identities form, it seems a rather extreme assumption that they can entirely 
prevent any subgroup influence via crisscrossing actors. It seems more plausible that the 
strength of subgroup identities affects how long it takes until the initial group splits can be 
overcome, but not the eventual outcome given the team has enough time to converge to a 
consensus. This also suggests that in the actual practice of work teams, crisscrossing actors 
may be important to overcome the negative effects of faultlines if management succeeds in 
creating conditions that support their integrating role. For example, an amicable and 
friendly environment in the work team may be important to reduce subgroup 
identifications and may therefore facilitate the exchange of arguments between the 
subgroups via crisscrossing actors.  
This paper revealed that short term consequences of group dynamics might crucially 
differ from their effects in the long run. Other recent contributions also proposed effects 
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of time on consequences of demographic diversity in work groups. Most prominently, 
Harrison et al. (2002) argued that as team members get to know each other, the relevance 
of surface level (demographic) characteristics will diminish and members will base selection 
of interaction partners more on psychological similarity (personality, values, attitudes, 
beliefs). Like our reasoning, their argument suggests that the impact of demographic 
diversity and thus of demographic faultlines declines over time (see also: Pelled, Eisenhardt 
and Xin 1999). However, we have shown that this follows already from the elementary 
behavioral assumptions of faultline theory, without the need to necessarily include 
additional mechanisms such as the distinction between surface similarity and psychological 
similarity. This demonstrates that already relatively simple models of social processes can 
be too complex to grasp their logical consequences by informal reasoning. Formal 
methods, therefore, are useful to study such complex systems and to reveal unexpected 
consequences of theories that may remain undiscovered otherwise. 
 
